The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act entitles many workers to “reasonable accommodations” for pregnancy-related medical conditions—so long as they do not impose an “undue hardship” on their employer. This Article addresses how the chaotic Americans with Disabilities Act doctrine will impact the PWFA’s implementation. The Article proposes a framework for litigants and courts assessing claims under the PWFA.

Scholars’ framing of Section 1983 as a “constitutional tort” and their focus on the qualified immunity doctrine miss the fundamental issue of Section 1983's transformation into a fault-based tort. This Article demonstrates how the judicial rewriting of Section 1983 has undermined its effectiveness and diverged from the Reconstruction Congress’ intent. The Article argues that Section 1983 should be interpreted as a strict liability statutory tort.

Past-due child support debt cannot be forgiven or discharged in bankruptcy. This policy is grounded in the assumption that all child support debt goes to a parent taking care of a child. However, billions of dollars of unpaid child support debt are instead owed to the government. Welfare debt often leads to a cycle of incarceration and criminal fines. This Article argues that for the bankruptcy system to uphold its normative principle of forgiving burdensome debt for the most economically vulnerable individuals, welfare debt must be forgiven.

“Suicide by cop” refers to encounters in which civilians intentionally provoke a lethal response from law enforcement. Police and their advocates have developed suicide by cop into junk science that serves as a broad defense against liability. This Article explores the origins and use of suicide by cop, and argues that police should be required to exercise a higher duty of care to protect people from excessive use of force.

What duties do Americans owe the state? Today, this question seems almost incomprehensible. Compulsions in the common interest are received coolly in our rights-obsessed culture, and the Supreme Court has never announced a framework for identifying the burdens of citizenship. This Article corrects the historical record by documenting how civic duties have developed over time. The evidence reveals that these obligations are constantly in motion; society has constructed, reshaped, and discarded them in decades-long struggles over the meaning of freedom. Put simply, the duties of citizenship are not fixed features of our constitutional order.

Most people agree that the institution of contract serves autonomy—or that it should. But how? Philosophical theories of contract link contract and autonomy by way of an appealing intermediate principle, such as the authority of the individual will, promissory morality, or conventions of agreement. However, each of these theories is focused on the mental and verbal acts surrounding contract and is thus at odds with both contract as a social practice and contract law. The theories fail to account for basic features of modern contracting such as anonymity, mass scale, and market determination of contract terms—facts to which both the common law and statutory regulation have long adjusted. This Article proposes a different approach to contract theory.

This Article employs recent philosophical advances in action theory and moral responsibility to critically examine the traditional purpose-knowledge-recklessness-negligence (PKRN) mens rea hierarchy of the Model Penal Code. It is a foundational assumption of the traditional mens rea hierarchy that the commission of intentional harm ought to be subject to greater criminal liability than actions that foreseeably result in risk of those same harms. The Article critically rethinks the standard mens rea hierarchy and show how we might amend current homicide doctrine (and the PKRN mens rea regime more generally) to allow more criminal liability for non-intentional police homicides like Derek Chauvin’s killing of George Floyd, relative to reluctant purposeful defendants.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems depend on massive quantities of data, often gathered by “scraping”—the automated extraction of large amounts of data from the internet. A great deal of scraped data contains people’s personal information. Although scraping enables web searching, archiving of records, and meaningful scientific research, scraping for AI can also be objectionable and even harmful to individuals and society. This Article explores the fundamental tension between scraping and privacy law. With the zealous pursuit and astronomical growth of AI, we are in the midst of what we call the “great scrape.” There must now be a great reconciliation.

Environmental law has an animal problem. It lacks an account of whether and how animals’ interests matter. Case in point: The agencies tasked with protecting wild animals cannot stop killing them. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration slays sea lions to reduce predation on endangered salmon. The Fish and Wildlife Service shoots barred owls to curb competition with northern spotted owls. These widespread “removals” reflect a tension between safeguarding ecological collectives, such as species and ecosystems, and protecting individual animals.

“Social justice” is everywhere in public law. Scholars and activists are calling for racial justice, climate justice, and health justice, among other claims. When commentators speak about multiple different social justice claims, it is often through an intersectional lens that views these claims as co-constitutive with one another, such as, “There is no climate justice without racial justice.” These justice claims are important and long overdue. But conflicts between different social justice claims—what this Article calls “justice conflicts”—are inevitable in policymaking. Justice conflicts occur when the multiple social justice claims involved in a policy issue point to opposing outcomes.

Despite ongoing disagreement about how the Constitution allocates powers among the different branches, the two dominant schools of thought in American separation-of-powers debates—formalism and functionalism—agree on three premises: Certain powers inhere in certain government branches, some powers are vested exclusively in one or another branch, and the judiciary is the final arbiter of separation-of-powers disputes. Disagreement is largely about how powers should be parsed and which should be shared. Yet over the long lifespan of our constitutional tradition, momentous doctrinal upheavals are relatively commonplace. This Article describes four tectonic shifts in separation-of-powers doctrine: Founding-era debates about how to define and blend powers, nineteenth-century debates about the constitutionality of the nascent civil service, Lochner-era debates about legislatures’ authority to define and regulate public utilities, and mid-nineteenth-century debates about the sources of international law.

Amazon’s dominance as a platform is widely documented. But one aspect of that dominance has not received sufficient attention—the Amazon Brand Registry’s sweeping influence on firm behavior, particularly in relation to the formal trademark system. Amazon’s Brand Registry serves as a shadow trademark system that dramatically affects businesses’ incentives to seek legal registration of their marks. The result has been a surge in the number of applications to register, which has swamped the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and created delays for all applicants, even those that previously would have registered their marks. And the increased value of federal registration has drawn in bad actors who fraudulently register marks that are in use by others on the Amazon platform and use those registrations to extort the true owners.

In 2022, the Biden Administration finalized regulations that overhauled procedures for asylum claims for the first time since 1996. These regulations transferred the duty to decide asylum claims in expedited removal from immigration courts to the Asylum Office. While advocates criticized the proposal for its extreme procedural deficiencies, they supported its basic premise: Expanding the jurisdiction of the Asylum Office would be a positive development for asylum seekers. This Article argues the Asylum Office has failed policymakers’ original vision for the asylum system, asylum seekers, and its own asylum officers (AOs) and that any expansion of the office, in its current form, is unwise.

Occupational licensing has been under attack from across the political spectrum. Economists argue that it is inefficient and costly; policymakers argue that it limits employment opportunities and hurts consumers; and antitrust regulators argue that it limits competition and creates cartels. Politicians, regulators, and courts have come to a rare consensus that licensing regimes must be restricted or repealed. This Article reimagines licensing in the twenty-first century as a source of opportunity rather than a pure barrier to entry.

It’s widely understood today that inequality is a major social problem that in turn contributes to other crises. By most accounts, tax systems are supposed to be our engines of equality. Yet in today’s United States, state and local tax systems mostly do the opposite: They take a greater percentage of the resources of the poor and middle class than of the rich. This Article argues that a truly progressive state tax system is possible and outlines how it could operate.

Scholars and advocates have long argued that a person’s consent to a warrantless police search is often so inherently coerced, uninformed, and shaped by race, class, gender, citizenship status, and disability that to call it a “choice” is fiction. This critique is not limited to police searches based on consent. Waiving rights and consenting to otherwise unconstitutional state action permeates criminal procedure. Given these concerns, this Article asks: What would happen if consent were eliminated from criminal procedure doctrines?

The Supreme Court is well-known to favor granting review in cases implicating circuit splits. When, for example, two federal appeals courts disagree over the meaning of a federal statute, the Supreme Court is likely to step in and resolve the confusion to ensure uniformity in federal law.

But the Court is also increasingly likely to let such splits languish for longer. It is taking fewer and fewer cases, year after year. And the Court dedicates much of the limited space on its docket to cases that do not involve circuit splits—cases that, say, present an opportunity to overrule precedent or that implicate patent matters.

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., decided in June 2023, held that consent remains a method of establishing personal jurisdiction independent of the “minimum contacts” test established by International Shoe Co. v. Washington. To many, the decision resolved ambiguity in personal jurisdiction doctrine and represented a straightforward way of establishing personal jurisdiction. But Mallory failed to consider the many complexities underlying consent.

For the over half-million people currently homeless in the United States, the U.S. Constitution has historically provided little help. In 2018, this changed. A series of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions gave homeless individuals a right to occupy public spaces with some of their belongings. The surprising source of the right was the Eighth Amendment. The courts held that for people with no way of complying with laws banning public sleeping, punishing them for doing so constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The constitutional law of confessions has a critical blind spot. In theory, the law serves two interests. First, it protects the autonomy of suspects by stipulating that they can be questioned while in custody only with their consent. Second, it restrains official misconduct by forbidding interrogation methods that overbear a suspect’s will. Even if the law adequately safeguards those interests, something is missing: reliability.