Print Edition
Articles, notes, and symposia pieces published in CLRโs print volumes.
The doctrinal landscape of internet-based personal jurisdiction is increasingly incoherent. Rules designed for a world of print and physical presence struggle to account for the realities of digital communication. Courts have treated virality and even conversational tagging, such as an @-mention of a forum resident, as evidence that a speaker purposefully directed their speech into that state. When speech alone is treated as the jurisdictional contact, nonresident defendants can be haled into distant courts they never expected, and lawful expression is chilled. By connecting personal jurisdiction fairness principles to First Amendment โchilling effectโ principles, this Note offers a new framework for jurisdiction in the digital ageโone that reflects the realities of online interaction and guards against litigation being used as a tool to silence critics.
Commercial activities, like selling a car or serving hot coffee, can generate a risk of loss to which multiple individuals are exposed. When burdens and losses are distributed across multiple stakeholders, when should negligence law tolerate or condemn the risky choice? A famous answer at the center of the first-year curriculum invokes the Hand formula: The failure to avoid a risk is negligent when the sum of the burdens of risk-avoidance is less than the sum of the expected losses. This Article argues that the Hand formula should be applied to multiparty cases by, first, disaggregating burdens and losses and comparing them on a pairwise basis, starting with the individual who bears the highest burden and the one who bears the highest expected loss.
Article II vests the executive power in the President. Yet Congress routinely empowers private plaintiffs, not just the President, to enforce public regulatory laws. Because of this, in almost every area of lawโfrom environmental and antitrust law to civil rights and securities lawโthe bulk of enforcement occurs through private civil suits rather than government-initiated litigation. Our original historical investigation of โpenal statutesโโa category of Founding-Era regulatory legislation that anticipated modern private rights of actionโuncovers the deep constitutional foundation of this tradition of private enforcement. We conclude that private enforcement does not violate Article II, except under extremely narrow conditions.
In debates about the future of work, scholars and policymakers often treat economic efficiency and distributive justice as the principal values at stake. In this Article, I argue that neither a transaction cost-centric analysis of employment nor one focused only on distributive justice or equality fully conceptualizes all that is at stake in the institutional design and legal regulation of how we work. Here, I provide the first in-depth theorization of work as a site of relational transaction benefits, with a specific focus on lawโs role in shaping them.
Amid the avalanche of recent important administrative law decisions, one case has received almost no scholarly attention: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In part, Corner Post expands judicial review for claims that an agency regulation violates the authorizing statute or the Constitution by allowing such substantive claims indefinitely. Congress should implement a six-year time bar for administrative procedure claims that accrues at the time of agency action, so that procedural claims would be allowed only for six years following a rulemaking. Otherwise, a court might invalidate a longstanding regulation because of an agencyโs years-old violation of procedural requirements, even if the regulation perfectly implements the authorizing statute and is consistent with the Constitution.
The concern raised by David Straussโs Essay might be addressed by positing an alternative, broader conception of judicial review than the one he proposes, which is inspired by the influential footnote in the Carolene Products case. My alternative view on the scope and nature of judicial review does not grow out of experience with American Constitutional history (which I am no expert on), but rather from a philosophical perspective grounded in liberal and democratic theory and from a comparative constitutional experience drawn from the European and Israeli contexts. I will present my position through a defense of two distinctions that seem essential to me.
CLR Online
The web edition of the California Law Review.
In January 2026, Anthropic published something unprecedented: a 79-page โconstitutionโ for its AI model Claude. The document is remarkable. It is not a terms of service agreement. It is not a list of prohibited outputs. It is, as the company describes it, โa detailed description of Anthropicโs intentions for Claudeโs values and behavior.โ This constitution stands as a foundational text meant to shape how an artificial intelligence understands itself, its obligations, and its place in the world. Anthropic is not merely programming behaviors. It is, at least rhetorically, cultivating something like AI integrity. Reading the document, one encounters genuine philosophical engagement rather than boilerplate risk mitigation. History offers little reason to believe that corporate ethics survive contact with quarterly earnings reports. But a possible future in which Anthropic is incentivized to abandon its morals is not the only risk. My claim, and the focus of this piece, is stronger: Anthropicโs constitution itself harbors existing risks, found in both express limitations and structural defects.
American democracy is under profound stress. This stress was caused by the legal erosion of hard-won voting rights protections. Supreme Court decisions have slowly chipped away at the Voting Rights Actโs safeguards, emboldening a wave of restrictive voting policies under the guise of promoting election integrity. These measuresโvoter ID laws, purges of voter rolls, closure of polling placesโare often defended as neutral bureaucratic management or lawful audits of the voter rolls to eliminate non-citizen registration. But in practice, they fall hardest on marginalized communities. The political playing field has been becoming increasingly skewed, and public faith in the democratic process has corroded with time. The Constitutionโs broad promise of equal voting access and fair political representation has thinned, and now reveals an unsettling paradox: At the very moment when electoral participation should be most protected amid democratic backsliding, it is increasingly precarious.
American states continue to actively regulate artificialintelligence (โAIโ) despite the Trump administrationโs efforts to stop them. Idaho and Utah have recently enacted bills that declare that AI is not a legal person. The same states that have enacted anti-AI personhood laws have also adopted laws declaring that embryos are people. Some argue that embryos should be granted legal personhood because they have potential to become people. By the same logic, AI is also a legal person because, as it evolves, some predict that it will share characteristics with humans. How do state legislative representatives justify granting embryos legal personhood, but denying AI the same?
Who does our government work for? How does our government shape our society? Who gets access to the power of the state when they have a problem or need help? None other than Chief Justice John Roberts himself has perpetrated a great lie that the ability to access our federal courts is a neutral, apolitical issue. In reality, our federal courts systematically favor the rich and powerful, particularly those who push a specific set of conservative policy outcomes, even when those outcomes are contrary to what Americans vote for and support. In order to rectify this disconnect, we must rethink the laws, rules, and regulations that structure federal courts, and grow capacity at the state level to ensure our system works for everyone, not just the rich and powerful.
When and how should an individual or an institution act in response to extortion? What should an individual or an institution do to oppose tyranny, illegality, oppression, or horror, if we suppose that the consequences of opposition might not be so good or might be terrible? These questions arose in stark form in 2025 in the context of efforts by the Trump administration to punish and bring to heel law firms, individuals, universities, and others.
In his second term, President Donald Trump has launched an unprecedented assault on the nationโs largest law firms. Through a series of executive orders and highly unusual EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) actions, the Trump regime has sought to undermine the independence of the private bar. In response, targeted firms have been forced to make a choice: to appease the administration or to fight back.
Symposia
Articles accompanying CLRโs conferences. Published in the print edition.
The concern raised by David Straussโs Essay might be addressed by positing an alternative, broader conception of judicial review than the one he proposes, which is inspired by the influential footnote in the Carolene Products case. My alternative view on the scope and nature of judicial review does not grow out of experience with American Constitutional history (which I am no expert on), but rather from a philosophical perspective grounded in liberal and democratic theory and from a comparative constitutional experience drawn from the European and Israeli contexts. I will present my position through a defense of two distinctions that seem essential to me.
Professor David Strauss attributes the U.S. Supreme Courtโs reactionary jurisprudence to a breakdown of elite consensus. He observes that lawyers and judges disagree about the proper โvictimsโ of our political process: Are they Black, Brown, and LGBTQ+ people or, instead, Whites, Christians, and gun owners? Under such elite โpolarization,โ Strauss worries the jurisprudential approach that emerged from Carolene Products allows for judicial intervention on behalf of groups loaded with political power. Even then, he insists on the classic liberal defense of the courts: that courts serve as an important if imperfect check against the majoritarian domination of minorities. But critical to such defenses is the unstated conjecture that elites are more enlightened than popular majorities.
In Dobbs v. Jackson Womenโs Health Organization and Obergefell v. Hodges, the Justices who attack substantive due process law equate it with Lochner. Today, crying โLochnerโ has so much force that it is often unclear what the objection itself entails. โLochnerโ warns federal judges to defer to a legislatureโs judgments in enacting ordinary social and economic legislation. But the modern substantive due process cases do not concern such legislation. In this Essay, we supply an answer to the Lochner objection by demonstrating how judicial review of substantive due process claims can be democracy-promoting.
Among law students, lawyers, jurists, and legal academics, the reasoning contained in Supreme Court opinions forms the indispensable object of examination. The centrality of those opinions is instilled from the very first moments of law school, as professors direct their students to scrutinize this key paragraph, that critical sentence, even the odd momentous footnote. The rationales undergirding various Supreme Court opinions receive not mere study, but valorization, worship, and occasionally even ridicule. However, this Essay contends that such claims wildly exaggerate the actual significance of judicial opinions.
Once upon a time, not that long ago, we had a pretty good explanation for why judicial review exists. The premise is that, for the most part, important decisions in a nation like ours should be made by politically accountable officials, not by courts. Unavoidably, though, there will be defects in the democratic political process. The role of the courts is to correct those defects, to the extent they can. One such defect is that some groups may not have their fair share of political power. If that is true, then the courts should intervene to protect that group. But this account is not quite right, and it is incorrect in a way that suggests a deep problem with judicial review today.
Department of State v. Muรฑoz was a critically important successor to Dobbs v. Jackson Womenโs Health Organization. In Muรฑoz, the Court continued efforts to shrink the protective force of the Due Process Clause. Even more significantly, the Court launched another attack on the equality principle undergirding cases including Loving v. Virginia. Through its rejection of substantive due process protections, the Court is intentionally weakening a broad swath of antidiscrimination protections and procedural due process rights.
Podcast
Interviews with the authors of articles, notes, or online pieces published in CLR.
In 2023, the Supreme Court decided Mallory v. Norfolk, Southern Railway Company, which held that consent remains a method of establishing personal jurisdiction independent of the minimum contacts test, first introduced by International Shoe Company. Washington. On the surface, this decision resolved ambiguities in personal jurisdiction doctrine. But, to explain to us how Mallory failed to consider the many complexities underlying consent to personal jurisdiction, Scott Dodson, a Distinguished Professor of Law at UC San Francisco, joins us to discuss his article, The Complexities of Consent to Personal Jurisdiction.
The amorphous administrative state is often oversimplified and misunderstood. Now, with the Trump Administration pushing for mass deportation and the DOGE dissecting and even disemboweling federal agencies, it is increasingly important to understand the different types of agencies, how they are run, and how agencies like the CBP, ICE, and the Bureau of Prisons create โat a massive scale the โfield of pain and deathโ that the law occupies.โ From detaining federal criminal prisoners and immigrants to engaging in armed conflicts and carrying out domestic arrests, these agencies are governed by statutes, regulations, and internal guidelines that nonetheless fail to stop violence and the misuse of force.
People usually think that all tax agencies do is ensure tax laws are followed. But for decades, the IRS has regularly facilitated immigration raids. These raids target employees even as the IRS investigates their employersโ potential tax violations. What can this state of affairs teach us about agency overreach? And what alternate paths could better align the IRSโs efforts with its mission? In this episode, UC Davis School of Law Professor Shayak Sarkar discusses the IRS's underappreciated role in immigration enforcement.
Traffic courts resolve over half of the cases in the U.S. legal system. These cases are easy for some defendants to handle by paying a fine, but they can have devastating effects for those with fewer means. And despite the key role these courts play in funding state judicial branches and other state and local programs, they have not been comprehensively studied in decades. Whatโs going on in traffic courts? And what can they teach us about the legal system more broadly? In this episode, Arizona State University Sandra Day OโConnor College of Law Professor Justin Weinstein-Tull explains his research on traffic courts.
Immigration adjudications regularly use information from the criminal legal system to justify a discretionary denial of relief or benefits, even when charges have been dismissed. This practice faces little scrutiny due to the assumption that adjudicators are merely importing facts already found by the criminal system. But what if this practice actually constitutes โhidden factfindingโ? Sarah Vendzules, a Senior Staff Attorney at the Office of the Appellate Defender in New York City, uncovers this hidden factfinding and offers a framework that could rein it in.
The U.S. carceral system disproportionately harms racial minorities and people living in poverty. Penal abolitionist frameworks have helpfully reframed the conversation to foreground those harmful social consequences. But how do those consequences affect our understanding of work, and particularly work that is both criminalized and undertaken in order to survive? In this episode, Indiana University Maurer School of Law Professor Yvette Butler explains her concept of survival labor and why it should be included in our general understanding of work.
