Be Not Afraid: How Ukraine Determined Its Future, United the West, and Strengthened Global Democracy

California Law Review · Be Not Afraid: How Ukraine Determined Its Future, United the West, and Strengthened Global Democracy

A version of this op-ed also appears in the Berkeley Journal of International Law.

Article 1, Section 2 of the United Nations Charter enshrined the “self-determination of peoples”—the ability to choose one’s destiny—as a fundamental right of every country.[1] In 1970, the UN General Assembly passed the Friendly Nations Declaration, which further defined this principle by making illegal any actions “aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any state or country.”[2] This Declaration, complemented by similar language in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[3] codifies each country’s right to self-determination free of forced foreign interference over their internal affairs or unprovoked invasion of their sovereign land.

Russia broke these international laws when it invaded Ukraine after months of troop buildup along its and Belarus’s borders.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to expand his power,[5] conquer another Slavic people, and end Ukraine’s pursuit of a democratic future away from his grasp as a member of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[6] His government stated[7] that Russia would topple Kyiv in three days and that Ukrainians would welcome Russian forces as “liberators.”[8] He lied to his people about “denazifying”[9] Ukraine while bombing[10] a Holocaust memorial and conveniently ignoring that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is Jewish and the son of Holocaust survivors.[11] He shelled civilians in maternity wards,[12] children’s hospitals,[13] and apartment blocks.[14] Putin flattened Mariupol[15] and massacred[16] hundreds of Ukrainians execution-style in formerly occupied cities like Bucha,[17] with plans for mass graves[18] to cover up his atrocities and reports of alleged chemical weapons use.[19] He gave the world a devastating glimpse at the deadly regional conflicts,[20] driven by dictators’ desire for power,[21] that plagued Europe for centuries before World War II.[22]

Yet, Ukrainians thwarted his ability to accomplish most of his objectives.[23] They opened reservoirs[24] and intentionally flooded roads to enhance the raputitsa (Ukrainian mud season), immobilizing and trapping hundreds of Russian tanks north of Kyiv for Ukrainian farmers to seize.[25] Supported by an unprecedented stream[26] of arms provided by NATO and EU states, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) took advantage of poor Russian morale[27] and planning[28] to block Moscow’s advances on all fronts. The UAF has stymied attacks from Chernihiv[29] and Sumy[30] to the east to Mykolaiv[31] in the south by keeping key roads, ports, and airfields under Ukrainian control despite being outnumbered and outgunned.[32] Using street blocks and buildings as shields, they held Mariupol for nearly two months despite an intense Russian siege.[33] And even in captured cities like Berdyansk[34] and Kherson,[35] citizen protests deeply undermined the Russian occupiers. This effective defense killed over 19,000 Russian troops and took out thousands of tanks, planes, vehicles, and other military equipment,[36] effectively limiting the Russian military campaign to the Donbas region.[37]

By withstanding and pushing back Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion, Ukrainians determined that their future as a sovereign state is theirs alone to decide. In doing so, Ukraine galvanized the West to mount decisive sanctions and military aid that have crippled Russia’s ability to wage wars of conquest, effectively enforcing international law on self-determination. Ukraine’s resistance, the West’s unity, and Russia’s naked aggression have sharply elevated public support for the post-World War II order[38] governed by institutions that protect democracy and human rights. Russia’s invasion has also proved the indispensability of NATO (whose mutual defense pact[39] protects member states from any country that violates their sovereignty) to Eastern European countries who fear encroachment on their territory by Moscow. These precedents protect the rights of vulnerable countries far beyond Europe’s borders.

Ukrainians determined their democratic future by repelling Russia’s invasion.

Russian military vehicles destroyed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Kyiv. Russia and Western experts severely underestimated Ukraine’s morale and fighting capability. Photo by the Government of Ukraine.

Putin, who has called the collapse of the Soviet Union one of the greatest tragedies[40] of the last century, believes that Ukraine and most Slavic states constitute Russia’s historic sphere of influence.[41] He thinks that Moscow is therefore entitled to control their affairs and ensure their friendliness to Russian domestic and foreign policies. Russia still exercises control over Belarus,[42] and largely maintained a similar “friendly” arrangement[43] with Ukraine for a decade until Ukrainians revolted and demanded their freedom in the Orange Revolution[44] of 2004 and the successful Euromaidan of 2014.[45] The latter resulted in the Kremlin-friendly president fleeing[46] the country in disgrace and his replacement by duly elected pro-democracy leaders.

Some Western pundits parrot Putin’s imperialist beliefs and argue that Ukraine and its neighbors should not “anger” or “provoke” Russia by pursuing democracy or EU and NATO membership, and that NATO countries were wrong to allow eastward expansion after the collapse of the USSR.[47] They also goad Kyiv into accepting massive territorial concessions in exchange for peace.[48] However, this “westsplaining” (a term coined by Professors Jan Smoleński and Jan Dutkiewicz) perpetuates imperialism and colonialism by denying Eastern European states agency in determining their future.[49] It instead treats states like Ukraine as pawns in a game of global chess and ignores the violent history Ukraine and its neighbors experienced under Russian domination that motivates their efforts to join NATO and the EU.[50] When they lived in the USSR, the Ukrainian people experienced political repression,[51] cultural genocide,[52] and the Holodomor: a famine that killed millions and was designed to subjugate Ukrainians and force them to accept Soviet rule.[53] This does not even begin to describe the Kremlin’s crackdowns on democratic dissidents in other countries behind the Iron Curtain.[54]

Westsplaining therefore amounts to a blatant violation of fundamental principles of international law, which state that no country is entitled to determine another’s affairs, no matter how large, aggressive, or expansionist they are. If Ukraine seeks to join the EU and NATO, that is their choice. If Ukraine feels it cannot negotiate until its full territorial integrity is guaranteed—including full control and removal of Russian troops from the Donbas region—that is their choice. Not Russia’s. Not Europe’s. Not the United States’s.

Ukraine’s resistance motivated NATO and Europe to enforce international law by devastating Russia’s war capabilities.

International law has no true judicial enforcement mechanisms. For instance, Russia can withdraw from any International Criminal Court statute,[55] and neither Moscow nor Washington are parties to the International Court of Justice’s compulsory jurisdiction.[56] This often leaves it up to alliances to apply international law. Examples include NATO enforcing UN resolutions against genocide by ending the mass killing of Muslim Bosnians[57] and Kosovans[58] in the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s.[59] Other examples include countries upholding international law against racial discrimination[60] by divesting from and boycotting South Africa during its Apartheid era,[61] and, most recently, Western countries sanctioning Russia for its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[62]

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, which clearly aimed to decapitate[63] the country’s leadership and install a favorable regime, demonstrates how far Russia and other illiberal actors will go to expand their power and defy global norms on sovereignty. Putin has hinted that he will not stop with Kyiv. He previously invaded Georgia[64] and occupied Moldova’s Transnistrian region[65] under the guise of “protecting” Russian minorities. His ultimatums[66] to NATO demanded a withdrawal of Allied forces out of Eastern European countries, including Baltic NATO states that fell under Soviet domination before 1991.[67] Foreign policy analysts routinely suggest that Putin aims to rebuild the old Russian Empire[68] and restore[69] what he sees as lost Russian influence,[70] much like how Hitler annexed most of Central Europe in the 1930s.[71]

Russia’s terror, which portended continued and even more brazen upheavals of international law (and included threats[72] to NATO members that would trigger its mutual defense pact[73]), along with Ukraine’s spirited resistance,[74] motivated the West to enforce global rules on self-determination and sovereignty. They did this, first, with the most destructive bevy of diplomatic and economic sanctions[75] in modern history that has eroded Russia’s ability to finance war and its global reputation. EU and NATO states have severed most Russian banks from SWIFT,[76] the global payments system, and other key financial markets,[77] effectively stopping Russia from importing any goods and freezing Russians’ ability to do business with the West. Russian companies may no longer raise money in most Western countries and are barred from exporting luxury items like vodka and diamonds.[78] Russian oligarchs’ assets have been frozen[79] and the country’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline is dead.[80] This overwhelming response has prevented Russia from buying the microchips, materials, and equipment needed to replenish their military[81] and will cause Russia’s GDP to drop by over 30% by the end of 2022,[82] slowly abrading its ability to finance war. Moreover, Russia has been booted from both the Council of Europe[83] and the UN Human Rights Council:[84] severing many diplomatic channels it could have used to garner support for its war effort.

On top of these $1 trillion measures,[85] which have effectively destroyed and isolated the Russian economy,[86] the West still has many tools left to punish Putin. This includes banning all Russian banks from SWIFT,[87] ending all Russian oil sales in Europe,[88] and eliminating Russia from both Interpol[89] and the UN Security Council,[90] among other sanctions.

A young Ukrainian refugee awaiting resettlement at Przemyśl train station in Poland. Many parents have sent their children away alone or with older relatives to safer parts of Europe while they stay behind to defend their country. Photo by Mirek Pruchniki.

Second, NATO and the EU have delivered extensive weapons shipments[91] to Ukraine, including advanced anti-aircraft defense systems, tanks, firearms, and protective equipment. This sustains the Ukrainian Armed Forces without risking a direct NATO engagement with the Russians. NATO complemented these weapons with vastly[92] increased military exercises and air coordination in member states bordering or close to Russia—a presence that was welcomed by Eastern European states.[93] These NATO and EU developments have unmistakably warned Putin that Allied countries will fulfill their Article 5 commitments to defend every inch of NATO territory should Russia decide that its incursions into Ukraine are not enough.

Unified Western actions clearly enforce international law on self-determination and set a precedent of shattering consequences for any country that attempts to invade another sovereign state. This is not 1914. It is not 1938. It is 2022. The world aspires to rules that prevent unprovoked incursions—not regional powers or the whims of dictators. And Allied nations can and will give these rules teeth.

The unprecedented unity of the West in its defense of Ukraine and international law has strengthened the rules-based world order, elevating democracy, human rights, and self-determination everywhere.

EU, G7, and NATO leaders standing shoulder-to-shoulder, united in their commitments to Ukraine and democracy. Photo by White House.

Public support for Ukraine continues to reach new highs, with most Americans[94] and Europeans[95] supporting the effort and the global institutions (like the EU and NATO) responsible for keeping the peace after World War II. As a partial result of this elevated public sentiment, EU[96] and NATO[97] countries have united to sanction Moscow and send humanitarian and military relief to Kyiv. These decisions allowed Allied countries to create a resounding collective impact that contrasts with the chaos of Brexit,[98] populism,[99] and the Trump presidency.[100] Putin not only bet against[101] this unity but actively sowed[102] division in Allied nations for his benefit. He was wrong and paid a heavy price.

The newfound unity of the West will have broad and transformative effects for the rules-based world order, strengthening its ability to stand up for smaller countries’ sovereignty and democratic institutions, just like it has in Europe.

This unity can first be seen in refugee policy, with Poland taking in over two million Ukrainians displaced from war,[103] Romania potentially taking over 500,000,[104] and the United States over 100,000 (a smaller number since many Ukrainians prefer to remain in Eastern Europe and return to their homes to rebuild after the fighting ends).[105] Thousands of volunteers have poured into Ukrainian border regions to help migrants access food and shelter—an effort Western countries have supported with billions of dollars in humanitarian relief money.[106]

The growing threat of Russian aggression has motivated countries once on the fence about NATO membership to finalize applications to the Alliance, including Finland and Sweden.[107] Their additions will achieve the exact opposite of what Russia desired from its aggression—more NATO neighbors and greater enforcement of international law.

However, this reset is truer nowhere else than Asia, where China still muses[108] about supporting the Russian invasion, actively threatens Taiwan,[109] and continues to conduct incursions into the South China Sea[110] and South[111] and Southeast Asia[112] that skirt the edges of international law on self-determination. These actions come in addition to ethically questionable[113] investment practices that have led African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries to owe Beijing large sums of debt[114] and prevented[115] them from condemning China’s egregious human rights violations against Uighur Muslims[116] and Tibetans.[117] A resurgent West, working together with its democratic partners in the Asia-Pacific, could coalesce again to hold China accountable for future violations of international law. Sanctions that could sever Beijing’s goods and supplies from the global supply chain are all on the table, just like they were for Russia.[118]

Hu Wei, who directs the Chinese government’s public policy institute, recently argued[119] that democratic countries have recently formed regional alliances like the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US)[120] and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US)[121] that deepen their economic and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. This already limits China’s potential for territorial incursions. However, with an enhanced reputation and strengthened resolve from their success in countering Russia’s authoritarianism, democratic countries may be willing to form new supply chains and trade agreements with the West that decrease their dependence on China and bolster their ability and willingness to sanction Beijing in the event of a Chinese international law violation. This would effectively erode Beijing’s growing influence in the region, empowering the defense of existing Asian democracies and inspiring further democratic reform in Asia.

Polish volunteers assist Ukrainian refugees in Przemyśl. Poland has taken in over 2.1 million refugees fleeing Russia’s invasion, or roughly 5% of its population. Photo by Pakkin Leung.

Hu correctly analyzes that China’s only choice in the wake of Russia’s failure in Ukraine is to avoid antagonizing the West and its democratic partners. That means no more territorial incursions, human rights violations, or support for rogue states like Russia, whose invasion China has so far backed off from funding due partly to Western pressure.

Therefore, the deterrent of strengthened global democracies has the potential to effectively enforce international law, protect the sovereignty of smaller states across Asia and Europe, and perpetuate the rules-based world order for decades to come.

Conclusion

“Be not afraid,” as Pope John Paul II repeated[122] in the face of Soviet repression.

The horrors of Russian aggression—communities terrorized by cluster bombs,[123] children hiding from shelling in makeshift shelters,[124] families starving to death in sieged[125] cities—demonstrate the stakes at hand if the world is governed not by international norms and rules regarding self-determination, human rights, and democracy, but by regional powers hellbent on territorial expansion. This is how the world existed for millennia before international law proscribing human rights abuses and colonialism were first introduced in the 1940s.[126]

But Ukrainians were not afraid. They refused to acquiesce and turn back the clock on liberty. In defending their sovereignty, they effectively united the West to enforce international law on self-determination through a devastating array of sanctions against Russia. The precedent set by these developments strengthen the rules-based world order and guarantee more sovereignty, democracy, and human rights for other vulnerable countries far beyond Europe’s borders.

Hiep Nguyen (JD '23) was the Senior Technology Editor (Vol. 111) of the California Law Review and the Senior Online Editor of the Berkeley Journal of International Law.

1. U.N. Charter art. 1, § 2. ↑

2. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 124 (Oct. 4, 1970). ↑

3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966., S. Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. ↑

4. David Brown, Ukraine Conflict: Where Are Russia’s Troops?, BBC News (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694. ↑

5. Paul Kirby, Has Putin’s War Failed and What Does Russia Want from Ukraine?, BBC News (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589. ↑

6. Joe Sommerlad, Why Does Russia Want to Block Ukraine from Joining NATO?, Indep. (Apr. 27, 2023), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-news-nato-membership-b2174404.html. ↑

7. Mike Eckel, Russian Officials Predicted a Quick Triumph in Ukraine. Did Bad Intelligence Skew Kremlin Decision-Making?, Radio Free Eur. (Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-invasion-ukraine-intelligence-putin/31748594.html. ↑

8. Luke Harding, Demoralised Russian Soldiers Tell of Anger at Being ‘Duped’ into War, Guardian (Mar. 4, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russian-soldiers-ukraine-anger-duped-into-war. ↑

9. Rachel Treisman, Putin’s Claim of Fighting Against Ukraine ‘Neo-Nazis’ Distorts History, Scholars Say, Nat’l. Pub. Radio (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/01/1083677765/putin-denazify-ukraine-russia-history. ↑

10. Tiffany Wertheimer, Babyn Yar: Anger as Kyiv’s Holocaust Memorial Is Damaged, BBC News (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60588885. ↑

11. James Hookway, Who Is Volodymyr Zelensky? What to Know About Ukraine’s President, Wall St. J. (May 12, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-is-volodymyr-zelensky-ukrainian-president-11646161781. ↑

12. Mstyslav Chernov, Pregnant Woman, Baby Die After Russian Bombing in Mariupol, Associated Press (Mar. 14, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-maternity-hospital-pregnant-woman-dead-c0f2f859296f9f02be24fc9edfca1085. ↑

13. Natalia Zinets, Ukraine Accuses Russia of Genocide After Bombing of Children’s Hospital, Reuters (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-promises-silence-ukrainians-flee-battered-cities-2022-03-09/. ↑

14. Alexander Smith & Phil McCausland, Facing Resistance in Ukraine, Putin Turns to a Familiar Playbook: Bombing Civilians, NBC News (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/facing-resistance-ukraine-putin-turns-familiar-playbook-bombing-civili-rcna20041. ↑

15. Daniel Boffey, Russian Shelling Has Reduced Mariupol to ‘Ashes of a Dead Land,’ Ukraine Says, Guardian (Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/22/ukraine-begs-putin-civilians-escape-ruins-mariupol-russia. ↑

16. Imran Khan, Bucha Killings: Survivors Recount Russian Atrocities, Al Jazeera (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51DszBMSEes. ↑

17. Malachy Browne et al., Satellite Images Show Bodies Lay in Bucha for Weeks, Despite Russian Claims, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/04/world/europe/bucha-ukraine-bodies.html. ↑

18. Nick Schifrin & Alexis Cox, Ukraine Exhumes Bodies from Mass Graves Discovered After Regaining Territory from Russia, PBS News Hour (Sep. 16, 2022), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/ukraine-examines-bodies-from-mass-graves-discovered-after-regaining-territory-from-russia. ↑

19. Ukraine War: US ‘Deeply Concerned’ at Report of Mariupol Chemical Attack, BBC News (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61077641. ↑

20. Niall McCarthy, The Real Reason Europe Needs the EU, Statista (Jun. 21, 2021), https://www.statista.com/chart/15458/the-estimated-number-of-violent-war-related-deaths-in-europe/. ↑

21. N. Atl. Treaty Org., A Short History of NATO (2022). ↑

22. Laust Schouenberg, Stanford Program Int’l & Cross-Cultural Educ., Why War Has Become Obsolete in Europe (2010). ↑

23. Yaroslav Hrytsak, Putin Made a Profound Miscalculation in Ukraine, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/19/opinion/ukraine-russia-putin-history.html. ↑

24. Reis Thebault & Dylan Moriarty, Satellite Images Show Flooding North of Kyiv in Possible Sign of ‘Hydraulic Warfare,’ Wash. Post (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/09/ukraine-intentional-flooding/. ↑

25. David Hambling, Mud Season in Ukraine Leaves Russian Tanks Stuck in Mire, Guardian (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2022/apr/12/mud-season-in-ukraine-leaves-russian-tanks-stuck-in-mire. ↑

26. Joseph Gedeon, The Weapons and Military Aid the World Is Giving Ukraine, Politico (May 10, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/22/ukraine-weapons-military-aid-00019104. ↑

27. Helene Cooper et al., As Russian Troop Deaths Climb, Morale Becomes an Issue, Officials Say, N.Y. Times (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/us/politics/russia-troop-deaths.html. ↑

28. Paul Sonne et al., Hubris and Isolation Led Vladimir Putin to Misjudge Ukraine, Wash. Post (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/11/putin-misjudged-ukraine-hubris-isolation/. ↑

29. Karoun Dermirjian & Dan Lamothe, Pentagon: Russia Has Fully Withdrawn from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Wash. Post (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/06/pentagon-russia-withdraws-kyiv-chernihiv/. ↑

30. Phil Stewart & Idrees Ali, Ukrainian Force Retake Town South of Sumy from Russia, U.S. Official, Reuters (Mar. 28, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-forces-retake-town-south-sumy-russia-us-official-2022-03-28/. ↑

31. Nick Paton Walsh et al., Russia Could Be Losing Ground in Battle for Mykolaiv, but It Still Seeks to Crush What It Cannot Have, CNN (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/21/europe/ukraine-russia-posad-pokrovske-mykolaiv-kherson-intl/index.html. ↑

32. Anne-Marie Green et al., Ukraine Outnumbered and Outgunned as Russian Military Invades, CBS News (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hv_FVgsAU_8. ↑

33. Mariupol: Battle for Key Port City Continues, Ukraine Says, BBC News (Apr. 11, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61068650. ↑

34. Brendan McFadden, Ukraine War: Protests Held in Russian Occupied Ukrainian Cities Kherson, Energodar, and Berdyansk, I News (Mar. 20, 2022), https://inews.co.uk/news/protests-held-russian-occupied-ukrainian-cities-kherson-energodar-and-berdyansk-1528616. ↑

35. ‘Go Home!’: Ukrainian Protesters Confront Russian Military Vehicles in Kherson—Video, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2022/mar/20/go-home-ukrainian-protesters-confront-russian-military-vehicles-in-kherson-video. ↑

36. @KyivIndependent, Twitter (Apr. 12, 2022), https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1513786745644634115. ↑

37. Robert Burns, Russia’s Failure to Take Down Kyiv Was a Defeat for the Ages, Associated Press (Apr. 7, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-battle-for-kyiv-dc559574ce9f6683668fa221af2d5340. ↑

38. See Matthew Kroenig et al., Atl. Council, Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China 49, 52 (2020). ↑

39. N. Atl. Treaty Org., Collective Defence and Article 5 (2023). ↑

40. Putin: Soviet Collapse A ‘Genuine Tragedy,’ NBC News (Apr. 25, 2005), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057. ↑

41. Andreas Kluth, The West Is Right to Deny Russia a “Sphere of Influence,’ Bloomberg (Jan. 12, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-13/putin-wants-to-establish-a-russian-sphere-of-influence-the-west-must-say-no#xj4y7vzkg. ↑

42. Amanda Coakley, Puppet State? How Putin’s War Could Drive Belarus Deeper into Russia’s Clutches, Indep. (Mar. 6, 2022), https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/world/belarus-russia-war-putin-lukashenko-b2029672.html. ↑

43. Jeremy Khan, Who Is Viktor Yanukovych, the Former Ukrainian President Putin Reportedly Wants to Put Back in Power?, Fortune (Mar. 2, 2022), https://fortune.com/2022/03/02/viktor-yanukovych-yanukovich-putin-put-back-in-power-ukraine-russia/. ↑

44. Adrian Karatnycky, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 84 Foreign Aff. 35, 51–52 (2005). ↑

45. Steven Pifer, Ukraine: Looking Forward, Five Years After the Maidan Revolution, Brookings (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/22/ukraine-looking-forward-five-years-after-the-maidan-revolution/. ↑

46. Alexander Baunov et al., A Year After Maidan: Why Did Viktor Yanukovych Flee After Signing the Agreement with the Opposition?, Carnegie Endowment Int’l Peace (Feb. 25, 2015), https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/59172. ↑

47. John Mearsheimer, Why the West is Principally Responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis, Economist (Mar. 19, 2022), https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis. ↑

48. Id. ↑

49. Jan Smoleński & Jan Dutkiewicz, The American Pundits Who Can’t Resist “Westsplaining” Ukraine, New Rep. (Mar. 4, 2022), https://newrepublic.com/article/165603/carlson-russia-ukraine-imperialism-nato. ↑

50. Id. ↑

51. Milena Nikolova et al., Past Political Repression Creates Long-Lasting Mistrust, Brookings (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/03/02/past-political-repression-creates-long-lasting-mistrust/ (describing how Soviet citizens “could be arrested, sentenced in a mock trial, and sent to a camp for stealing bread, having anti-Soviet thoughts, being well-off peasants, and failing to report any suspicious activity”). ↑

52. How Stalin Starved Ukraine, Vox (Mar. 25, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lejDbulJN54 (revealing how Moscow clamped down on Ukrainian identity by discouraging music, literature, and the Ukrainian language). ↑

53. Id. ↑

54. Mark Kramer, The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings, 33 J. Contemp. Hist. 163, 210–11 (1998) (noting that the Soviet crackdown on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 killed or wounded 22,000 Hungarians and resulted in subsequent purges, deportations, and executions of dissidents). ↑

55. Shaun Walker, Russia Withdraws Signature from International Criminal Court Statute, Guardian (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/russia-withdraws-signature-from-international-criminal-court-statute. ↑

56. Iryna Marchuk, Ukraine Takes Russia to the International Court of Justice: Will It Work?, Eur. J. Int’l L: Talk! (2017). ↑

57. Holocaust Museum Houston, Genocide in Bosnia, https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/. ↑

58. Frontline, Ethnic Cleansing and Atrocities in Kosovo (2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/cleansing/. ↑

59. David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 Fordham Int’l L. J. 129, 133–34, 149–50 (2001) (discussing NATO’s justification of its bombing campaign in Kosovo as a means of enforcing UN resolutions against genocide). ↑

60. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 20. ↑

61. The Crown: 48:1 (Netflix television broadcast Nov. 15, 2020) (portraying Commonwealth countries’ struggle in convincing Margaret Thatcher to sign on to sanctions against South Africa). ↑

62. Edward Hunter Christie, Sanctions After Crimea: Have They Worked?, NATO Rev. (2015), https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/07/13/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/index.html. ↑

63. Phil Stewart & Idrees Ali, Russia Plans to ‘Decapitate’ Ukraine Government—U.S. Defense Official, Reuters (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/world/us-believes-russia-planning-decapitate-ukraines-government-2022-02-24/./ ↑

64. Patrick Kingsley, Ukraine Reminds Georgia of Its Own War with Russia. That Creates a Dilemma, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/19/world/europe/ukraine-georgia-war.html. ↑

65. Madalin Necsutu, Council of Europe Designates Transnistria ‘Russian Occupied Territory,’ BalkanInsight (Mar. 16, 2022), https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/16/council-of-europe-designates-transnistria-russian-occupied-territory/. ↑

66. Grayson Quay, Putin Threatens Military Action if NATO Rejects Russian Ultimatum, Week (Dec. 26, 2021), https://theweek.com/russia/1008414/putin-threatens-military-action-if-nato-rejects-russian-ultimatum. ↑

67. Ana Palacio, Not Just Ukraine: Putin Wants to Remake the World, New Atlanticist (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/not-just-ukraine-putin-wants-to-remake-the-world/. ↑

68. Niall Ferguson, Vlad the Invader: Putin Is Looking to Rebuild Russia’s Empire, Spectator (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/vlad-the-invader-putin-is-trying-to-recreate-the-tsarist-russian-empire/. ↑

69. Pamela Falk, Putin Wants to Be the Russian Leader “Who Restored the Empire,” Ukraine’s U.N. Envoy Says, CBS News (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-un-ambassador-kyslytsya-says-putin-wants-to-restore-empire/. ↑

70. Palacio, supra note 67. ↑

71. U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, German Prewar Expansion. ↑

72. Andrew Roth, Russia Issues List of Demands It Says Must be Met to Lower Tensions in Europe, Guardian (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato. ↑

73. Missy Ryan & Sammy Westfall, Baltic States Urge Allies to Ramp Up Defense in Face of Russian Threat, Wash. Post (Mar. 7, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/07/lithuania-baltics-putin-ukraine-blinken/. ↑

74. Eric Schmitt et al., How Ukraine’s Military Has Resisted Russia So Far, N.Y. Times (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/us/politics/russia-ukraine-military.html. ↑

75. Michelle Toh et al., The List of Global Sanctions on Russia for the War in Ukraine, CNN (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/25/business/list-global-sanctions-russia-ukraine-war-intl-hnk/index.html. ↑

76. Patricia Kowsmann et al., West Orders Seven Russian Banks Off Swift, But Leaves Others On, Wall St. J. (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-01/card/west-orders-seven-russian-banks-off-swift-but-leaves-others-on-OMv9TCsZMQqlze9dQQRm. ↑

77. @potus, Instagram (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.instagram.com/p/CaXy-ahPMyT/. ↑

78. Toh et al., supra note 75. ↑

79. Fact Sheet: United States and Allies and Partners Impose Additional Costs on Russia, White House (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/24/fact-sheet-united-states-and-allies-and-partners-impose-additional-costs-on-russia/. ↑

80. Angela Dewan, The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Is on the Scrap Heap Because of the Ukraine Crisis. Here’s Why That Matters, CNN (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/22/business/nord-stream-2-russia-ukraine-europe-germany-climate-intl/index.html. ↑

81. @kamilkazani, Twitter (Mar. 26, 2022), https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1507819508609679364. ↑

82. @RobinBrooksIIF, Twitter (Mar. 9, 2022), https://twitter.com/RobinBrooksIIF/status/1501655620105166852. ↑

83. Council of Europe Officially Expels Russia After 26 Years of Membership, Radio Free Eur. (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.rferl.org/a/council-europe-expels-russia/31756178.html. ↑

84. Pamela Falk, U.N. Votes to Remove Russia from Human Rights Council, CBS News (Apr. 7, 2022), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-removed-un-human-rights-council/. ↑

85. Charles Riley, The West’s $1 Trillion Bid to Collapse Russia’s Economy, CNN (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/01/business/russia-economy-sanctions/index.html. ↑

86. Ryosuke Hanafusa, Energy Guru Yergin: Putin Has Destroyed the Economy He Built, Nikkei Asia (Mar. 21, 2022), https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Energy-guru-Yergin-Putin-has-destroyed-the-economy-he-built. ↑

87. See Philip Blenkinsop, EU Bars 7 Russian Banks from SWIFT, but Spares Those in Energy, Reuters (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/eu-excludes-seven-russian-banks-swift-official-journal-2022-03-02/. ↑

88. See Jorge Liboreiro, After Coal, the EU Faces an Uphill Battle to Ban Russian Oil and Gas, EuroNews (Apr. 28, 2022), https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/04/12/after-coal-the-eu-faces-an-uphill-battle-to-ban-russian-oil-and-gas. ↑

89. UK Will Lead on Efforts to Get Russia Suspended from Interpol, Says Minister, Reuters (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-will-lead-efforts-get-russia-suspended-interpol-says-minister-2022-02-28/. ↑

90. Andrew MacLeod, King’s Coll. London, Ukraine Invasion: Should Russia Lose Its Seat on the Security Council? (2022), https://www.kcl.ac.uk/ukraine-invasion-should-russia-lose-its-seat-on-the-un-security-council. ↑

91. Matthew Weaver, What Weapons Have Other Countries Supplied to Ukraine?, Guardian (Mar. 17, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/17/what-weapons-have-other-countries-supplied-to-ukraine. ↑

92. Erin Doherty, NATO to Agree to “Major Increases” of Troops on Eastern Flank, Axios (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.axios.com/2022/03/23/nato-jens-stoltenberg-ukraine-russia-summit. ↑

93. Julian Borger, NATO Needs Permanent Force in Eastern Europe to Deter Russia, Says Estonia, Guardian (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/23/estonia-nato-tripwire-eastern-europe-ukraine-russia. ↑

94. Frank Newport, What We Know About American Public Opinion and Ukraine, Gallup (Mar. 18, 2022), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/390866/know-american-public-opinion-ukraine.aspx. ↑

95. Cornelius Hirsch, Europeans Support Ukraine Joining the EU—but Not Yet, Politico (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.politico.eu/article/poll-show-european-back-ukraine-path-to-eu-membership/. ↑

96. Statement by President von der Leyen on Further Measures to Respond to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, European Comm’n (Feb. 27, 2022), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1441. ↑

97. Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government, N. Atl. Treaty Org. (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm/. ↑

98. Adela Suliman, Not on the Agenda but Brexit Threatens Unity at G-7 Summit, NBC News (Jun. 12, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/not-agenda-brexit-threatens-unity-g-7-summit-n1270574. ↑

99. William A. Galston, The Rise of European Populism and the Collapse of the Center-Left, Brookings (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/08/the-rise-of-european-populism-and-the-collapse-of-the-center-left/. ↑

100. Julian E. Barnes & Helene Cooper, Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns over Russia, N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html. ↑

101. Leader: Western Disunity Is a Gift to Putin, New Statesman (Jan. 26, 2022), https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2022/01/leader-putin-tests-the-west. ↑

102. Young Mie Kim, Brennan Ctr. Just., New Evidence Shows Russia’s Election Interference Has Gotten More Brazen (2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-evidence-shows-how-russias-election-interference-has-gotten-more. ↑

103. Rafał Kostrzynski & Andreas Kirchhof, Poland Welcomes More than Two Million Refugees from Ukraine, United Nations High Comm’r Refugees (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/news-releases/poland-welcomes-more-two-million-refugees-ukraine. ↑

104. Romania Could Take in 500,000 Ukrainian Refugees If Needed—Defence Minister, Reuters (Feb. 22, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romania-could-take-500000-ukrainian-refugees-if-needed-defence-minister-2022-02-22. ↑

105. Miriam Jordan et al., United States Will Welcome Up to 100,000 Ukrainian Refugees, N.Y. Times (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/ukrainian-refugees-biden.html. ↑

106. Jonathan Masters & Will Merrow, How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts, Council Foreign Rel. (May 19, 2023), https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts. ↑

107. Sune Engel Rasmussen, Sweden, Finland’s About-Face on NATO Membership Was Years in the Making, Wall St. J. (Jun. 8, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-finlands-about-face-on-nato-membership-was-years-in-the-making-8b86c324/. ↑

108. Edward Wong & Julian E. Barnes, Russia Asked China for Military and Economic Aid for Ukraine War, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/13/us/politics/russia-china-ukraine.html. ↑

109. Steve Inskeep, China’s Ambassador to the U.S. Warns of ‘Military Conflict’ over Taiwan, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Jan. 28, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/28/1076246311/chinas-ambassador-to-the-u-s-warns-of-military-conflict-over-taiwan. ↑

110. Lynn Kuok, How China’s Actions in the South China Sea Undermine the Rule of Law, Brookings (Nov. 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-chinas-actions-in-the-south-china-sea-undermine-the-rule-of-law/. ↑

111. Joanna Slater, Soldiers Injured in Fresh Border Skirmish Between India and China, Wash. Post (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-china-clash-sikkim/2021/01/25/7d82883c-5edb-11eb-a177-7765f29a9524_story.html. ↑

112. Koya Jibiki et al., China’s Incursions over Malaysia Add to South China Sea Disputes, Nikkei Asia (Jun. 6, 2021), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/China-s-incursions-over-Malaysia-add-to-South-China-Sea-disputes. ↑

113. Mark Green, China’s Debt Diplomacy, Foreign Pol’y (Apr. 25, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/. ↑

114. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Africa’s Rising Debt: Chinese Loans to Continent Exceeds $140 Billion, Econ. Times (Sep. 23, 2021), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/africas-rising-debt-chinese-loans-to-continent-exceeds-140-billion/articleshow/86444602.cms?from=mdr. ↑

115. Dickens Olewe, Why African Countries Back China on Human Rights, BBC News (May 2, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56717986. ↑

116. Aamer Madhani, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on China over Human Rights Abuses of Uighurs, PBS NewsHour (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-imposes-sanctions-on-china-over-human-rights-abuses-of-uighurs (describing abuses of ethnic and religious minorities and “forced sterilization and large detention camps where many Uyghurs allegedly are compelled to work in factories”). ↑

117. Hum. Rts. Watch, China: Events of 2019 (2020), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/china (noting severely restricted “religious freedom, speech, movement, and assembly,” “land grabs by local officials” involving “intimidation and unlawful use of force,” the expulsion of “thousands of Buddhist monks and nuns,” and intense “Sinicization” policies that effectively erase Tibetan culture and heritage). ↑

118. Zeyi Yang et al., The Russia Sanctions Are an Important Lesson for China, Protocol (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.protocol.com/newsletters/protocol-china/russia-sanction-china-lesson. ↑

119. Hu Wei, Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s Choice, U.S.–China Perception Monitor (Mar. 12, 2022), https://uscnpm.org/2022/03/12/hu-wei-russia-ukraine-war-china-choice/. ↑

120. Sheila A. Smith, The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know, Council Foreign Rel. (May 27, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know. ↑

121. Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS, White House (Sep. 15, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/. ↑

122. Kelly Marcum, 43 Years Ago and Today, John Paul II Urges Us: ‘Be Not Afraid,’ Nat’l Cath. Reg. (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.ncregister.com/blog/43-years-ago-and-today-john-paul-ii-urges-us-be-not-afraid. ↑

123. John Ismay, Cluster Munitions and ‘Vacuum Bombs’: Russian Invasion Revives an Old Debate, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/us/politics/cluster-munitions-vacuum-bombs-russia-ukraine.html. ↑

124. Yuras Karmanau & Mstyslav Chernov, These Are the Scenes from Inside a Makeshift Ukrainian Shelter, ABC 10 (Feb. 28,. 2022), https://www.abc10.com/article/news/nation-world/ukraine/what-its-like-inside-a-ukraine-shelter/507-a4170d4d-b16f-4ad1-a0d9-c368b384bacf. ↑

125. Hannah Moore & Isobel Koshiw, The Siege of Mariupol, as Told by Residents Who Escaped, Guardian (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2022/mar/24/the-siege-of-mariupol-podcast. ↑

126. See Max Roser et al., Our World Data, War and Peace (2020) (attributing the decline in deaths from wars since 1945 to the end of colonialism). ↑